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A Research and Educational Affiliate of TransAfrica NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1983 
SUBSTITUTING FORCE FOR DIPLOMACY: 
TODAY GRENADA, TOMORROW ... ? 
On October 25, 1983 nearly 2,000 U.S. Marines and Army Rangers stormed the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada. A 
bloody coup, which left Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and at least sixteen other persons dead, finally had provided the 
Reagan administration with the long-awaited excuse to resort to military intervention. In justifying the invasion, President 
Reagan first offered three reasons for his "decisive action:" to protect the lives of up to 1,000 Americans residing on the 
island, to "forestall further chaos," and to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order on the island. To 
shroud his blatantly illegal act in some form of legitimacy, the Reagan administration later added that the invasion had 
been carried out in response to a request made by Grenada's frightened neighbors in the Eastern Caribbean-Antigua, 
Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent-and by two other CARI COM members-Barbados and Jamaica. Further, the Presi-
dent argued that the island had become "a Soviet-Cuban colony" being readied to strike at its neighbors. Grenada, therefore, 
posed an intolerable threat to U.S. national interests. 
President Reagan had always believed that the U.S. had a special responsibility to maintain order in its backyard. In 
invading Grenada, the administration hoped to attain goals that heretofore had been unattainable. It could remove the 
last vestige of a government it hated; it eventually could install the 
government of its choosing; and it could frighten progressive govern-
ments or left-leaning movements throughout the region. 
In the final analysis, the invasion also had been launched to send 
a clear signal to the Soviets, the Cubans, the Nicaraguans, the 
Syrians, and all other troublemakers. Although it was coincidental 
that the invasion of Grenada occurred just two days after more than 
two hundred U.S. Marines were killed in Lebanon, both are horrify-
§ ing examples of growing U.S. militarism. The message the admin-
o. istration intended the Grenadian invasion to convey was that the U.S. 
[ would assert its authority and impose its will from Nicaragua to 
1 Namibia through armed intervention if necessary. Consequently, 
; '' American military personnel are now . .. everywhere: in El Salvador, 
~ in the Sudan, in Lebanon, in England and West Germany, in Turkey 
and Greece, in Diego Garcia and South Korea and Honduras ... and around the Persian Gulf,"as British historian E. P. 
Thompson has written. 
After the first few hours, the Reagan administration boasted that its invasion had been a ''complete success.'' Certainly, 
thousands of Marines could make short shrift of the 110,000 Grenadian people and fewer than 800 Cuban collaboration 
workers on the island. Equally important, the invasion scored a significant domestic political victory for Reagan. Having 
barred the press from covering the invasion, the administration was free to feed a sanitized version of the invasion to the 
American people; and this version went largely unchallenged even after the press was allowed on the island. 
The polls taken after the invasion clearly demonstrated public approval. Although constitutionally-protected rights such 
as freedom of the press are supposedly sacred in this country, relatively little opposition to the ban on the press was re-
corded. Concerns about international law, diplomacy, relations with U.S. allies, and worldwide condemnation all were com-
pletely forgotten. 
The attack on Grenada seemed to instill a renewed feeling of confidence in the national psyche. In one move it seemed 
that Washington had magically blotted out the memories of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the 
Iranian hostage crisis. Returning veterans received a hero's welcome and were asked few questions by the majority of Americans 
who had not experienced the horrors of war firsthand. The resurgence of militarism became evident as combat uniforms 
and paraphernalia became popular fashion items, and the armed forces reported an increasing number of new recruits. 
This ISSUE BRIEF looks at the invasion of Grenada within the larger context of U.S. military intervention throughout 
this hemisphere on numerous occasions sigce the nineteenth century. Current actions fall neatly within the long pattern 
of U.S . relations with its neighbors because the U.S. again relied on brute force rather than diplomacy to compel com-
pliance with its wishes. Indeed, previous U.S. governments voiced exactly the same pretext in almost exactly the same words 
to explain the invasions of Cuba in 1898, Nicaragua in 1912, and the Dominican Republic in 1965. The invasion of Grenada 
has shown that the U.S. still shoots first and asks questions later. For the rest of the world-both friend and foe alike-
undoubtedly, this is a frightening precedent. □ 
U.S. INTERVENTION: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE .... 
"I spent 33 years and 4 months in active service as a member 
of our country's most agile military force-the Marine Corps . 
. . . I spent most of my time being a highclass muscle man 
for big business. for Wall Street, and for bankers . . . . Thus, 
I helped make Mexico . .. safe for American oil interests in 
1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the 
National City Bank boys to collect revenues in . ... I helped 
purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of 
Brown Brothers in 1909-1912. I brought light to the Domini-
can Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. 1 helped 
make Honduras 'right' for American fruit companies in 
1903 .... " 
U.S. Major General Smedley D. Butler 
For more than 150 years, the United States has intervened 
repeatedly in the political and economic affairs of its neigh-
bors in the Western Hemisphere. Since warning European 
nations to refrain from interference in "Our Hemisphere" 
with the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the 
U.S. has attempted to assert its hegemony and to "protect" 
its interests throughout the region. As a consequence, the 
U.S. has found it necessary to participate in more than eighty 
instances of military hostility in this region alone. Of course, 
having been self-appointed as the arbiter of the affairs of 
the region, the t.: .S. has felt no need to gain the prior con-
sent of those countries it deemed necessary to protect. 
Rather, it has intervened willfully in blatant violation of 
international law with impunity. 
Through its earliest interventions, the U.S. began the pro-
cess of building the American empire and of consolidating 
its position as the dominant economic power in the region. 
U.S. entrepreneurs found that neighboring less-developed 
nations offered cheap raw material, a cheaper labor force, 
and ample opportunities for investment. Thus, as the Secre-
tary of State during the presidency of William Howard Taft 
described it, U.S. policymakers came to envision the region 
as "a game preserve from which poachers were excluded 
but where the proprietor may hunt as he pleases." In this 
context, the U.S. government began intervening in the inter-
nal affairs of other nations to protect the interests of Amer-
ican private investors. If a country defaulted on its repay-
ment of loans made by private banks, the U.S. government 
would occupy the country, assume control of that country's 
government, and force repayment. Consequently, interven-
tion in the early decades of the twentieth century resulted 
in protracted U.S. military occupation of five nations. 
Since the Cold War of the 1950s, U.S. intervention has 
been directed toward preventing progressive change, popular 
insurgency, and social revolution in the region. Again, the 
tnreat progressive change has posed is largely to the U.S. 
business community. If revolutionary governments assume 
power and are committed to strengthening their national 
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economies or to lessenmg traditional ties of dependence, 
then they are perceived to represent a threat to American 
firms with substantial interests in those countries. 
Hence, in the last two centuries the U.S. has "sent in the 
Marines" from Panama to Paraguay. The methods of inter-
vention employed have been quite varied: political "protec-
tion," economic pressure, financial control, military occu-
pation, and more discreet "shows of force," among others. 
The pretexts for these interventions, on the other hand, have 
been all too similar. As in the most recent case, U.S. govern-
ments have cloaked their baser motives by invoking "no-
bler" objectives-"protecting American lives and property" 
or "safeguarding freedom and democracy." 
Clearly, American property has been a real consideration, 
but "safeguarding freedom aad democracy" has been much 
less so. The historical record demonstrates that the U.S. has 
shown no ability to restore democracy through its many in-
terventions. In fact the more likely result of intervention has 
been support for corrupt and repressive dictators who could 
not remain in power without U.S. protection. The U.S. has 
fought to maintain governments which suit the image of 
U.S. policymakers and which allow American businesses to 
conduct business as usual. For example, interventions in 
both Guatemala and Chile removed democratically-elected 
governments; and the invasion of the Dominican Republic 
prevented the return to office of a democratically-elected 
government which had been overthrown. As Franklin 
Roosevelt aptly put it, the U.S. has preferred to support 
"our son of a bitch" rather than risk revolutionary change 
no matter what the cost to the people of that country. 
Until the invasion and occupation of Grenada, the one 
exception to the rule of U.S. intervention in this hemisphere 
had been the English-speaking Caribbean. As former colo-
nies of Great Britain and as members of the British Com-
monwealth, these nations had not suffered the fate of the 
former colonies of France and Spain. What the Reagan ad-
ministration's military intervention has done is to signal a 
renewed determination by the U.S. to exert control over the 
entire hemisphere. 
Long after U.S. combat troops return from Grenada, the 
entire region will be affected by the intervention of yet 
another nation by the United States. The invasion of Grena-
da demonstrated once more U.S. disregard for the sovereign-
ty of its neighbors, its intolerance of diversity, and its con-
tempt for diplomatic solutions to problems. The logical 
question raised by the invasion is when will the U.S. strike 
again. Who will be the next vicdm'? Today Grenada, tomor-
row Nicaragua. . . . □ 
A HISTORY OF U.S. INTERVENTION: WHO INVITED U.S.? 
1833: U.S . sends forces to Argentina to protect American inter-
ests during an insurrection . 
1835 Marines protect American interests in Peru during an at-
tempted revolution. 
1846: U.S. fights war with Mexico which ends in 1848. 
1852: Marines land in Argentina to protect American interests 
during a revolution. 
1853: U.S. intervenes in Nicaragua to protect American lives and 
interests during political disturbances. 
1854: U .S. destroys Nicaraguan city to avenge an insult to the 
American Minister to Nicaragua. 
1855: U.S . and European naval forces land to protect American 
interests during an attempted revolution in Uruguay. 
1856: U .S. intervenes to protect American interests during an 
insurrection in Panama. 
1858: Forces from two U.S. warships land to protect American 
property during a revolution in Uruguay. 
Congress authorizes a naval squadron to seek redress for 
an attack on a naval vessel in Paraguay. 
1865: U.S. intervenes in Panama to protect the lives and property 
of American residents during a revolution. 
1868: U.S. sends forces to Uruguay to protect foreign residents 
and the customhouse during an insurrection. 
1888: U.S. sends troops to Haiti to persuade the Haitian govern-
ment to give up an American steamer which had been 
seized on the charge of breach of blockade. 
1890: U.S. naval party lands in Argentina to protect U .S. consu-
late and legation in Buenos Aires. 
1891: U.S . intervenes to protect American citizens during a revo-
lution in Chile. 
1894: U.S. sends forces to Brazil to protect American commerce 
during a Brazilian civil war. No landing is attempted, but 
there is a display of naval force. 
U.S. intervenes to protect American interests in Bluefields, 
Nicaragua following a revolution. 
1895: U.S. sends troops to protect American interests in Colom-
bia. 
1896: U.S. sends forces to Nicaragua to protect American lives 
and property. 
1898: U.S. intervenes in Nicaragua to protect American lives and 
property. 
U.S . intervenes in Cuban war for independence from 
Spain, defeats Spain, and assumes control of Puerto Rico, 
Cuba, Hawaii, and the Philippines . 
1899: U.S. sends forces to Nicaragua to protect American inter-
ests during an insurrection. 
U.S. establishes military rule in Cuba which lasts until 
1902. 
1903: U.S. sends forces to Honduras to protect the American 
consulate. 
U.S . intervenes in the Dominican Republic to protect 
American interests during a revolutionary outbreak. 
U.S. sends troops to Panama to protect American inter-
est following the revolution for independence from Colom-
bia over construction of the Isthmian canal. With brief 
intermissions, U.S. stations troops in Panama to guard 
U.S . interests until 1914. 
1904: U.S. sends troops to the Dominican Republic to protect 
American interests during revolutionary fighting. 
1906: U.S. intervenes to restore order, protect foreigners, and 
establish a stable government in Cuba. U .S.-imposed civil-
military rule lasts until 1909. 
1907: U.S . sends troops to Honduras to protect American inter-
ests during a war between Honduras and Nicaragua. 
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1910: U.S . intervenes during a civil war in Nicaragua to protect 
American interests. 
1911: U.S . sends forces to Honduras to protect American lives 
and property during a civil war. 
1912: U.S . lands a small force in Honduras to prevent govern-
ment seizure of an American-owned railroad. 
U.S. troops supervise elections in Panama. 
U.S. intervenes to protect American interew, in Cuba . 
U.S. sends troops to Nicaragua 10 protect American inter-
ests during an attempted revolution. A ,mall fon.:e would 
remain until 1925. 
1914: U.S. sends forces to Haiti 10 protect American national, 
during a period of unrest. 
U.S . naval force by gunfire stops the bombardment of 
Puerto Plaza and by threat of force maintains Santo Do-
mingo City in the Dominican Republic during a rc"olu-
tionary movement. 
1915: U.S. maintains order in Haiti from a period of threatened 
insurrection until I 934. 
1916: U.S. forces intervene and maintain order in the Domini-
can Republic until 1924. 
1917: U.S. sends forces to Cuba to protect American interests 
during an insurrection and subsequent unsettled condi-
tions. Most of the force leaves Cuba by 1919, but two com-
panies remain until 1922. U.S . maintain \ prc\encc until 
1933. 
1919: U.S. sends forces ashore to maintain order in Hondura\ 
during an attempted revolution. 
1920: U.S. intervenes in Guatemala to protect American intere,ts 
during a period of fighting between the Unionist Party 
and the government. 
1921: U.S. intervenes to prevent a war between Panama and 
Costa Rica over a boundary di spute. 
1924: U.S. sends troops to Hondura, to protect American lives 
and interests during election ho~tilities. 
1925: U.S. sends forces to Honduras to protect foreigners during 
a political upheaval. 
U.S. lands troops in Panama to keep order and protect 
American interests . 
1926: U.S . sends Marines to Nicaragua to protect American 
interests during an attempted revolution. Some U.S. forces 
remain in the country until I 933 . 
1933: U.S . Naval forces demonstrate off Cuban shores during 
a revolution against President Gerardo Machado, but no 
landing is made. 
1940: U.S. sends troops to guard air and naval bases in Bermuda, 
St. Lucia, Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Trinidad, and 
British Guiana obtained by negotiation with Great Britain 
against the wishes of the local governments. 
1954: U .S.-sponsored coup results in the overthrow of the dem-





U.S. sponsors invasion of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. 
U.S. imposes naval blockade of Cuba. 
U.S. troops kill student protesters in the Panama Canal 
Zone. 
U.S. invades the Dominican Republic and forces the over-
throw of the elected government of Juan Bosch. 
1973: U .S.-sponsored coup results in the overthrow of the dem-
ocratically-elected government of Salvador Allende in 
Chile . 
1983: U.S. invades Grenada to protect American students and 
to restore democracy. □ 
VIEWPOINT: MICHAEL MANLEY 
The invasion of Grenada has set a most dangerous prece-
dent. It has brought the English-speaking Caribbean within 
the tradition of U.S. intervention in this Hemisphere, which 
has been a long and formidable one for the last one hun-
dred years. The English-speaking Caribbean had always 
been spared that because we have been a part of the British 
Commonwealth. We have now by our own invitation de-
fined ourselves within that sphere in which there is a clear 
precedent for U.S. military intervention. 
We do not know that the U.S. would have invaded if they 
had not been invited. I have no doubt that they did it with 
relish . I have no doubt that they always had a contingency 
plan to do it. I have no doubt that they were merely waiting 
for the appropriate pretext. The fact is, however, that they 
were invited. This is an absolutely disasterous error in its 
implications for the future. 
One has to draw a very careful distinction between the 
probable motivation of the members of the OECS and that 
of Jamaica and Barbados. It may well be that the OECS 
countries felt threatened and were genuinely frightened by 
the whole situation. But it was also true that they thought 
of this as a good opportunity to get rid of any traces of a 
genuinely progressive political process of the sort that Bishop 
symbolized. They wanted to remove that political process 
and thereby to eliminate what they regarded as a danger to 
the region. 
In so far as Barbados and Jamaica are concerned, I have 
absolutely no doubt that there was no question of fear of 
anything at all. They acted as a result of their own internal 
political agenda. They saw the tremendous mistake and di-
saster that occurred in Grenada as an opportunity to remove 
all traces of the kind of progressive process that Bishop 
represented. 
The errors that were made within Grenada itself are a very 
real set-back to the progressive cause. On the other hand, 
the invasion is going to have a different effect. The inva-
sion is now very popular in the Caribbean for a variety of 
reasons. Of course, this popularity represents at least a tem-
porary setback of serious proportions. It was overwhelm-
ingly popular in Grenada for three reasons. Everybody in 
the minority who was opposed to the progressive direction 
of affairs is thrilled about the invasion because it wipes out 
the progressive process for the time being. The great ma-
jority of the people who really loved Bishop very, very deeply 
are thrilled because they feel his execution has been avenged 
and that his executioners will now be punished. Therefore, 
they see the invasion as a great act of revenge for Bishop. 
Obviously, Bishop's being avenged is something that would 
emotionally appeal to them in the short-run. There are also 
a lot of other people who might not have fallen into either 
one of those categories but who were absolutely scared out 
of their wits. Their feeling was that anything that could lift 
the curfew and could deal with the military group who exe-
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cuted Bishop and frightened t11em all was of benefit for the 
time being. Therefore, in the short-run the invasion would 
be popular. 
Trinidad is the island closest to Grenada. A poll there 
found that sixty-one percent of the people favored the in-
vasion and only thirty-nine percent were opposed. There is 
a tremendous inter-penetration of population between Trin-
idad and Grenada. The emotions, therefore, spill over. In 
Jamaica fifty-eight percent of those polled favored the inva-
sion while forty-two percent were opposed . The polls are 
obviously accurate. But this degree of opposition to the inva-
sion is really quite an achievement when you consider the 
massive manipulation that has occurred. 
The tremendous propaganda build-up that accompanied 
the invasion was unprecedented in the Caribbean. The 
Cuban presence was exaggerated, distorted, and lied about. 
The dishonesty can have no equal in the last twenty years 
of international history. The Caribbean press has pushed 
that propaganda line and absolutely nothing else. This must 
be attributed to the power of the press and is a comment 
on the dishonesty of the press. It has literally presented a 
view of events that is just unbelievable. 
In Jamaica the propaganda being spread through the 
streets is ''if Manley comes back to power, that is what will 
happen to him and that will lead to an invasion and all the 
horrors will be brought to Jamaica." Though completely 
childish, this kind of propaganda has its effects in the short-
run. 
The invasion throws down the gauntlet to the political pro-
cess to sort itself out. One can expect as rapidly as possible 
the development of a new alignment of forces in the Carib-
bean, in Latin America, in the Third World, and in the 
United States which will put the issues of sovereignty and 
the right of countries to be free to pursue the process of their 
self-determination on the line . 
The invasion already is beginning to force the Caribbean 
political leadership to sort itself out between the neo-colo-
nialists like Seaga and Adams-whose only interest is the 
promotion of the region as an out-post for tourism and U.S. 
multinational corporations-and what I would call the pa-
triots-the genuine independence people, whether socialist 
or not, who begin with a strong sense of Caribbean nation-
alism. People must now stop and think: what has happened 
to our independence that we could by our own act wipe it 
out so quickly. 
CARICOM had already been under tremendous strain. 
It, in fact, will now be under greater strain because it ap-
pears that Barbados and Jamaica sat at the CARICOM Con-
ference on the fateful weekend before the invasion having 
already made their deals with President Reagan to invade 
Grenada. They sat at the Conference with their major senior 
colleagues and concealed that fact from them. Therefore, 
they had a CARICOM meeting which represented a very 
dark chapter in Caribbean history. One set of people had 
made a secret deal and another set of people not only disap-
proved of that kind of solution to the problem but also did 
not even know that the deal had been made. It is scandalous 
for members of a region to regard themselves as having a 
deeper allegiance and contact with a major superpower than 
with their own regional colleagues; and we are going to pay 
dearly for it. □ 
Michael Manley is former Prime Minister of Jamaica and leader 
of the opposition People's National Party. 
GRENADA'S "REAL" THREAT 
" People of Grenada. this rerolt11ion is for \\'Ork, fo r f ood, 
for decent housing and health sen·ices, and for a bright f uture 
for our children and great grandchildren . . . " 
Prime Mini ster Mau rice Bishop 
While much has been made of Grenada's alleged military 
threat to its neighbors in the Eastern Caribbean, the only 
"real" threat lay in the People's Revolutionary Govern-
ment's (PRG) accomplishments since 1979. What the 
island's invaders actually had come to fear was the "dem-
onstration effect" the Grenadian Revolution created for 
other Caribbeans who were dissatisfied with their lot and 
who might have been persuaded by Grenada's example to 
struggle to change things for the better. 
When the Bishop government assumed power, Grenada, 
like its neighbors, was suffering from the adverse effects of 
the world recession. The demand for tropical exports-nut-
meg, mace, bananas, and cocoa-was sluggish. In 1981 the 
average world market price for nutmeg was $2.48 per pound, 
but it fell first to $1.95 and then to $1.20 during 1982. The 
price of cocoa, which had been $1.54 per pound in 1981, 
had plunged to $0.81 a year later. Tourism lagged, and bank-
ruptcies increased. These conditions produced little or no 
growth throughout the region . 
Nonetheless, Grenada was one of the very few countries 
in the Western Hemisphere that had per capita growth in 
the early 1980s. The New Jewel Movement (NJM) had im-
plemented a comprehensive economic development strategy 
which attacked the problems of a previously deteriorating 
economy on several fronts. The government's program had 
four goals and produced rather impressive results. These 
goals were to: rehabilitate existing infrastructure and add 
to Grenada's infrastructure investment, stimulate produc-
tive investment both on the part of the private sector and 
through increased public investments, improve the efficiency 
of the public sector and maintain sound public finances, and 
emphasize agriculture and tourism. According to the World 
Bank, Grenada was successfully " ... addressing the task 
of rehabilitation and of laying better foundations for growth 
within the framework of a mixed economy." 
Agriculture clearly dominates Grenada's economy as the 
main supplier of food, the major earner of foreign exchange, 
and the largest employer. In implementing its goals, the PRG 
spent fifty-four times more on agriculture than did the Gairy 
government. The government enhanced and upgraded ex-
tension services and technical assistance to individual 
farmers. It provided substantial flows of financial assistance 
for banana and cocoa rehabilitation. It re-organized and ra-
tionalized state-owned farms and established private coop-
eratives of small farmers. 
The World Bank estimated that the PRG's program re-
sulted in nine percent per capita growth. The principal bene-
ficiaries of this achievement were the Grenadian people. Un-
employment fell from 49.0 percent in 1979 to 14.2 percent 
in 1982. Considered a privilege under the Gairy regime, 
education was made a right under the PRG. The latest cen-
sus found only seven to ten percent illiteracy, down signifi-
cantly from the fifteen percent projected by a 1979 World 
Bank report. Free milk and hot lunches were provided for 
primary school children. A new secondary school was con-
structed, and secondary school fees were reduced. Univer-
sity scholarships were increased from 3 in 1978 to 209 in 
1981 . 
Significant improvements also were made in health care 
delivery. An increase in the number of doctors in residence 
on the island allowed for major expansions in health care 
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facilities. Each parish was equipped with a medical and a 
dental clinic. Twenty-eight medical stations were placed 
throughout the country. New departments were added to 
the main hospital; and the Ministry of Health offered the 
assi~tance of a professional health planner. The government 
created a Food and Nutrition Council to combat dietary 
problems and stressed the importance of preventive medicine 
in attacking the nation's health problems. 
In sharp contrast to Grenada's progress, the situation in 
neighboring countries remained bleak. Life-threatening 
hunger may not exist, but chronic malnutrition and the lack 
of stable employment still are serious problems. Although 
Antigua has an abundance of arable land, food production 
in this country decreased due to government policies em-
phasizing tourism and foreign investment. In Dominica 
eighty percent of children under five suffer from intestinal 
parasites. The local diet is adequate in calories but deficient 
in proteins. Forty-four percent of the land is divided among 
forty-one large estates while ninety-eight percent of those 
who work the land are either small farmers or sharecrop-
pers whose plots are too small to support their families. In 
St. Vincent nine farms comprise fifty-one percent of the 
arable land. Unlike the NJM, the governments of these 
countries have shown little concern for the needs of their 
poor, especially in the rural areas. 
Unable to discount the social and economic progress that 
had been made in Grenada, its neighbors focused their most 
vocal complaints on the PRG's abandonment of Westmin-
ster-style parliamentary democracy . After years of perverse 
manipulation of the electoral system by Gairy, the Grena-
dian revolution was directed toward creating an "alternative 
model of change." Although the PRG recognized that the 
active participation of the Grenadian people was critical, 
it did not give precedence to the establishment of a formal 
electoral mechanism for channeling that participation. In-
stead, the Bishop government sought to fulfill this objec-
tive by diffusing political power and by encouraging broad-
based participation. In 1981 the NJM opened membership 
in the party support groups and mass organizations . As a 
result, the Parish councils-the organs of popular partici-
pation-were inundated with new members . The NJM fur-
ther decentralized the political process by instituting Zonal 
Councils in each of Grenada's seven parishes. These bodies 
provided regular interaction between the Grenadian people 
and their government based on a principle of accountabili-
ty in which officials would face the citizenry to account for 
their performance. At the typical Zonal and Parish Coun-
cil meetings, a member of the PRG Cabinet and one or more 
managerial-level government officials would be present to 
report, listen, and answer questions concerning current pol-
icies, the implementation of programs, and local grievances 
or concerns. 
During its last year, the PRG began the process of creating 
a formal, electoral system which would institutionalize pop-
ular democracy. In June Prime Minister Bishop announced 
the formation of a national Constitutional Commission 
which would draft a constitution, propose an electoral 
system suitable for Grenada, and hold elections in the near 
future. 
As a result of its inability to resolve internal differences 
humanely, the NJM's ]audible accomplishments have been 
destroyed. The current occupation of Grenada wipes out all 
possibilities that the system envisioned by the PRG will be 
created in Grenada. What we are left with is a noble experi-
ment which suffered an untimely demise. □ 
VIEWPOINT: A.W. SINGHAM 
The leaders of most of the countries of the Eastern Carib-
bean- including Maurice Bi shop-signed a treaty which 
form ed th e Organi zation of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS) . That treaty was never registered at the United Na-
tions; but we are told that this was a result of a bureaucratic 
mi sunderstandin g and that they had planned to register it. 
The prov isions o f the treaty allow a member country to re-
quest th at the other members aid them in the event of foreign 
interventi on. o such request, as far as we know, came from 
the government of Grenada. 
We are told, however, that the request was transmitted 
by the Governor General, who is a titular officer. Therefore , 
he has no ri ght what soever to speak for the government of 
Grenada. Sir Paul Scoon was appointed by and owed his 
job to Mauri ce Bishop who recommended Scoon's name to 
Her Majesty the Queen of England. Her Majesty the Queen 
then appointed him as a titular officer to take over the head-
ship of the government as her representative. Sir Paul pro-
ceeded to act extra-constitutionally according to both the 
l 973 co nstitution and the people's law proclaimed by the 
Bishop gove rnm ent. The British themselves are very wary 
o f giving power 10 the Queen's representative primarily 
because in British Constitutional practice the Queen has no 
autho rit y over Parliament. The British fought very hard to 
reta in Parliamentary supremacy over the rights of the 
Crown . Sir Paul has not necessarily violated the constitu-
tion in term s of the letter of the law; but more importantly, 
wh a t he has done is to destroy the conventions in British 
Parli amentary practice which clearly would not allow for 
hi s intervention. After all, Sir Paul was captured-some 
would say liberated - by the U.S. marines. He was taken 
to a ship off I he shore of Grenada then brought back to 
hi s residence. Now he is being protected by the Barbadian 
arm y. Therefore, Sir Paul owes his position to the occupying 
power which enables him to govern . His Provisional Ad-
viso ry Council essentially has been approved by and authen-
ticated by the United States and the other occupying coun-
tries-thus making them spokespersons of the occupying 
countries. 
Moreover , the OECS treaty provides that all members be 
present when such a decision is made. Now we are told that 
some of the members were not present. We were informed 
later , by a non-OECS member, that there was some confu-
sion as to whether the request was coming from the coun-
tries to the United States or whether the United States was 
alread y advi sing them about making the request. Hence, it 
seems to me that the members of the OECS were determined 
to play this role long before the so-called request came from 
Sir Paul Scoon . 
The major instigators of this particular move were P rime 
Minister Eugenia Charles from Dominica, Prime Minister 
John Compton of St. Lucia, and Prime Minister Vere Bird 
from Antigua, who had already indicated that they were 
strong supporters of the Reagan administration. They were 
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joined by two non-OECS members, Jamaica and Barbado,, 
who had no business bei ng there except fo r th e fact that 
Prime Mini ster Ed wa rd Seaga and Pri me Min i, tcr Tom 
Adams, like Mrs. Charl es and Mr. Bird , , hare th e fo reig n 
policy orientations of the Reagan admin is tra ti on. Thm, the 
like- minded conservat ive co untries of th e Easte rn Carib-
bean, Jamaica, and Barbados-who shared the over-all eco-
nomic, political, and social objecti ves of the Reagan admin -
istration - had joined together to und ert a ke thi s in vas ion . 
Their aim was to create an America n milit ary bloc in the 
English-speaking Caribbean-thus co ntradicting, at least for 
some of them , th eir commitment to non-alignment. 
This conservati ve bloc was experiencing serious int ern al 
economic problems which they have been unable to resolve . 
The bulk of them are mon o-crop economies, who are heavily 
dependent on the proposed Caribbean Basin Initiati ve (CBI) . 
Hence, they saw thi s military alliance as a way out of th e 
hell of underdevelopment and massive un employment that 
the people of their countri es face. These are also countries 
marked by internal political instability. They wanted the CBI 
eventually to be transformed into a Caribbean security ar-
rangement, creating a mini-NATO in the Caribbean. There-
fore the internal characteri stics o f these countries-their in-
ability to solve economic problems and to maintain law and 
order within their countries-led them to search for a mili-
tary security pact that would guarantee their regimes. This 
particular venture has transformed the English-speaking 
Caribbean into a military zone-the very phenomena these 
countries claimed they wanted to avoid. 
Curiously, after the World Bank had given Grenada such 
a clean bill of health, these countries began to be fearful 
of Grenada 's mixed economy model. Up to this point, Puer-
to Rico had been considered the model; but it was becom-
ing obvious that the Puerto Rican model was seriously 
flawed. Not only did they fear Grenada ' s economic model, 
but they feared that Grenada was embarking on a new model 
of constitutional democracy that would seriously threaten 
the existing elite structure of the Caribbean. We must re-
member that the two-party system-the Westminster 
model-was essentially designed to guarantee democracy in 
the Caribbean . However, this very Westminster model was 
responsible for the rise of Eric Gairy in Grenada because 
he was able to utilize it to consolidate a totalitarian regime. 
He perverted the constitutional process and proceeded to 
create a one-party system by exploiting the electoral system. 
This was precisely what Bishop had opposed. He had argued 
that this so-called Westminster model was totally unsuitable 
for Grenada because to a large extent it tribalized a non-
tribal people . In other words, what we saw happening was 
that the two-party system was utilized by the political elite 
to divide the population into two separate groups and pro-
ceeded to use patronage to keep one faction in power and 
to consolidate the political power of the party that had con-
trol over Parliament. Patronage then gave rise to a machine 
or a gang. So what we had in Grenada under Gairy was not 
two-party democracy but two-gang politics in which gangs 
had replaced parties. Hence, Bishop's experiment with gen-
uinely democratic institutions as an alternative to the ex-
isting two-party system which had been perverted by Carib-
bean governments was one of the greater threats that these 
neighboring countries felt came from Grenada. D 
A. W. Singham is a Professor of Political Science at the Brooklyn 
College of the City University of New York. 
REAGAN WATCH: JUST WHAT HE ALWAYS WANTED 
"Grenada, we were told, was a friendly island paradise for 
tourism. But it wasn't. It was a Soviet-Cuban colony being 
readied as a major military bastion to export terror and under-
mine democracy. We got there just in time." 
President Ronald Reagan 
Since assuming office, the Reagan administration has as-
serted that communism is on the march in the face of weak 
and vacillating U.S. policies. His goal, therefore, has been 
to employ the decisive action necessary to "relegate [com-
munism] to the dust heap of history." In no region of the 
world has he attempted to fulfill this "sacred trust" more 
zealously than in the Caribbean. In this context, tiny Gre-
nada took on special significance. If the U.S. could not stop 
communism in "its own backyard," then where could it? 
Finally, the Reagan administration had what it most wanted: 
the perfect opportunity-in one fell swoop and at little cost 
to the U.S.-to stamp out communism in Grenada, to teach 
all other communists a lesson, and to restore American con-
fidence in its ability to rule the world. 
From the moment the Bishop government assumed power, 
Grenada has been viewed as an irritant by U.S. policy-
makers. Open hostility toward Grenada began under the 
Carter administration as early as April 1979. A series of 
radio broadcasts from Gairy's new home in San Diego, Cal-
ifornia, calling for a counter-coup, prompted the Bishop 
government to ask for security assistance from the United 
States. Although the Carter administration refused Bishop's 
request for bilateral assistance, it sent Frank Ortiz, the Am-
bassador to the Eastern Caribbean, to meet with Prime Min-
ister Bishop. Ortiz warned Bishop that the U.S. would "view 
with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to 
develop closer ties with Cuba.'' The ambassador added that 
talk of "mercenary invasions" would harm Grenada's tour-
ist industry and offered $5000 from his discretionary fund 
to aid in rebuilding the island. 
When the Bishop government formalized relations with 
Cuba, the outraged Carter administration considered Gre-
nada to be a threat to U.S. interests and began to act ac-
cordingly. A number of measures, including covert opera-
tions against Grenada, were discussed. The National Security 
Council (NSC) formulated a plan to initiate a blockade 
against the country. After reviewing the options, the Carter 
administration rejected the NSC plan, but it adopted other 
measures designed to harass Grenada. The State Department 
refused to accept the credentials of the Grenadian Ambas-
sador-designate. Under pressure from the U.S., the Wind-
ward Islands Banana Growers Association excluded Grena-
da from a U.S. grant for the rehabilitation of hurricane-
damaged banana trees. USAID attempted to block food 
damage assistance for Grenada from the OAS Emergency 
Fund. Charging that Grenada had not fulfilled legal require-
ments for extradition, the U.S. refused to return Gairy to 
the island. Under the advice of State Department officials, 
some travel agencies began to discourage their clients from 
visiting Grenada. In addition a massive media campaign to 
discredit Bishop and the PRG began in which newspapers 
and magazines decried ''The Castroization of Grenada. '' 
The Reagan administration merely increased the intensi-
ty of attacks against Grenada begun by its predecessor. In 
March 1981 the U.S. director on the Board of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) successfully opposed Grena-
da's application for a $6.3 million of IMF Special Drawing 
Rights to be used for capital improvements. Grenada was 
refused a $3 million loan from the International Develop-
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ment Association (IDA) when the U.S. used its influence 
within the World Bank to prevent it from endorsing Gre-
nada's public investment program. 
Arguing that the proposed Grenadian international air-
port would accommodate Cuban military aircraft and would 
be used as a forward base to disrupt the U.S. supply routes 
in the Eastern Caribbean, the Reagan administration tried 
to dissuade both attendance and pledges at a European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) co-financing conference on the 
airport. The administration tried to convince EEC members 
that the airport's 9000-foot runway would be longer than 
necessary to service tourist and import/export traffic. 
Despite arguments that Barbados (11,000 feet), Curacao 
(13,000 feet) , Trinidad (10,000 feet), Bahamas (11,000 feet), 
Guadeloupe (11,499 feet) , Martinique (10,827), and Puer-
to Rico (10,002) had airports with longer runways, the Rea-
gan administration continued to rail against it. When the 
EEC voted to honor Grenada's request, the U.S. began a 
vicious propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting the 
country. Transferring the attack from print to film, the 
American Security Council Foundation released "Attack on 
the Americas," in January 1981, depicting Grenada as a 
Soviet stronghold. A five-part CBS television series released 
in May, "The Prisoner and the Police State," alleged that 
Grenada is a police state in which people are afraid to speak 
and prisoners are tortured. 
In June 1982 the U.S. offered $4 million to the Carib-
bean Development Bank (CDB) on the condition that no 
money go to Grenada. And like its predecessor, the Reagan 
administration refused to extradite Gairy, failed to respond 
to the appointment of a new Grenadian Ambassador-desig-
nate, instructed the new U.S. Ambassador to the Eastern 
Caribbean to exclude Grenada from his charge, attacked the 
regime in numerous public statements both here and abroad, 
refused to acknowledge Grenadian attempts to normalize 
relations, and excluded Grenada from participation in the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). 
Meanwhile, the Reagan administration readied plans for 
the destabilization of Grenada. The ghastly murder of 
Maurice Bishop and his compatriots simply provided the 
first available excuse to implement it. From August to Oc-
tober 1981, the U.S. military staged maneuvers which con-
stituted a practice run for the ultimate invasion of Grenada. 
On Vieques Island, the U.S. base off the coast of Puerto 
Rico, more than 200,000 military personnel from the U.S. 
and fourteen allied countries invaded "Red," "a mythical 
island interfering in the region and shipping arms to Cen-
tral America'' (Cuba), and '' Amber and the Amberdines,' ' 
"Our enemy in the Eastern Caribbean where U.S. hostages 
were in need of rescue," (Grenada and the Grenadines). Ac-
cording to the fictional scenario, after rescuing the hostages, 
the U.S. troops would remain on Amber to "install a regime 
favorable to the way of life we espouse.'' Thus, the ground-
work for the invasion had actually been laid as long as two 
years ago. Although then Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
discounted charges that these maneuvers had symbolic im-
plications for Grenada, two years later, the very military 
units that had participated in the Pentagon's hypothetical 
war-scenario on Vieques were being parachuted into Gre-
nada as part of "Operation Urgent Fury." In carrying out 
the invasion of Grenada, President Reagan had fulfilled the 
commitment made first during his 1980 campaign and main-
tained throughout his administration: to use U.S. military 
power against any nation daring to· challenge North Amer-
ican control. □ 
VIEWPOINT: RAMON SANGHEZ P AROQ!__ 
The Cuban government and party had no previous knowl-
edge of the differences within the New Jewel Movement 
(NJM) which led to the coup and the events that followed. 
In fact we were quite surprised when we learned from the 
Grenadians for the first time on October 12 of the internal 
struggle within the party. Although we had very close ties 
with the NJM and in particular with Maurice Bishop, ht. 
rightly chose not to discuss his difficulties within the party 
with us. Even after October 12, we did not know exactly 
what was going on, what the different positions were, and 
how events were developing. We chose not to interfere in 
any way in those events because it was an internal problem 
to be solved bv the Grenadian people. 
We had had quite extensive relations with Grenada since 
1979. We tried to establish cooperation and to provide as-
sistance to Grenada in different fields. The most important 
project in which we were involved was the building of the 
airport to which we were providing basically the labor force 
for construction of the airstrip and the airport buildings. 
Other equipment and services for the airport had been grant-
ed under contract to mainly British companies. We were also 
involved in other assistance programs in public health, in 
education, in the fishing industry, and in communications. 
In addition we were requested to provide military assistance 
and advice to Grenada because they had been certain of an 
impending U.S. invasion since the first days of the revolu-
tion in 1979. 
We had 784 Cubans in Grenada at the time of the inva-
sion: 636 were construction workers; 43 were part of the 
military advisory group (22 officers and the rest support 
staff); 17 were public health workers; 19 were from the 
Education, Fisheries, and Communications Ministries; and 
18 were in our diplomatic mission. Among them were 44 
women. The overwhelming majority of our workers were 
construction workers. It would be very easy to access this 
just by looking at them and by talking to them: the dif-
ference in ages, for example, and in physical fitness prove 
that they were not the highly trained professional soldiers 
that the Reagan administration alleged. 
Grenada was a sovereign and independent country and, 
as such, had all the rights to enter into agreements with any 
other country for its defense. Grenada had been threatened 
by invasion from the United States for a long time. The U.S. 
was a threat to Grenada-not the reverse as was alleged by 
the invaders . The U.S. is more than 27,000 times the size 
of Grenada in territory and has 2,300 times the population 
of Grenada. Grenada could not be a threat to the U.S. be-
cause it lacked the economic resources, the military re-
sources, and the manpower resources to present a threat to 
any other country in the region. 
Looking at the tapes that were shown of the kind of 
weapons that the U.S. military authorities have said were 
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found in Grenada, it is clear that they are not sophisticated 
weapons . Most of what I have seen were very light infantry 
weapons. Even the anti-aircraft weapons we have been 
shown are also very unsophisticated-fit for use by militias 
or by personnel that are not highly-trained soldiers or troops. 
But the U.S. officials only talk about "large numbers" or 
"significant amounts;" they have not provided an account-
ing of the weapons in terms of what kinds were found. They 
are trying to create the illusion that there was a large military 
base on the island, but there is no way to prove that anything 
of that kind was found in Grenada because it did not exist. 
The only weapons in Grenada were those to be used by the 
popular militia in case of an invasion. The tragic events that 
led to the coup on October 19 so alienated the people of 
Grenada from the group which took power that those wea-
pons were not distributed to tbe people and a large part of 
the population did not come out to support that group. 
The Reagan administration acts or reacts out of a geo-
political conception of the world. They believe that events 
in the world are due to the perceived weakness of the U.S. 
after Vietnam and Watergate. They also believe that the 
Soviet Union is constantly taking advantage of this perceived 
weakness. 
In fact things are quite different from what this adminis-
tration believes. The world is moving towards consolidation 
of the independence of nations of many sizes and the realiza-
tion that any nation-regardless of size-has the right to 
sovereignty. What has happened throughout the world is 
not a question of the weakness of the U.S. It is not a ques-
tion of any other power trying to take advantage of that 
weakness. It is a result of historical, political, economic, and 
social conditions objectively and concretely reflected in the 
different countries. . 
If any lesson can be derived from what the U.S. has done 
in Grenada, it is that Third World nations have to be bound 
closer together in order to make it impossible for large 
powers like the U.S. to act in blatant violation of interna-
tional law with total disregard for the sovereignty and the 
integrity of any nation, whether large or small. These events 
show everyone in Latin America, for example, that they can-
not look to the U.S. to favor their independent development. 
It shows that Latin American countries have to stick together 
and have to defend themselves if they want to maintain and 
consolidate their sovereignty. 
The U.S. has shown that it is only willing to support solu-
tions of a military nature which creates greater obstacles for 
efforts like those of the CONT ADORA Group to find a 
peaceful solution to the conflict in Central America. The 
invasion shows that the U.S. does not support political and 
peaceful solutions to problems, but only wants to impose 
military solutions. 
Cuba is convinced that a negotiated settlement to the con-
flict in Central America is possible, but we have little hope 
that the U.S. will support this kind of a solution. We were 
under the impression that the U.S. was not willing to go 
ahead with a political solution for the problems in Central 
America. Now, we have seen a very concrete example of 
what the U.S. is capable of doing. Of course, the situations 
are different, but the U.S. approach is quite similar. The 
U.S. invasion of Grenada can lead only to more complicated 
situations throughout the region and the hemisphere. D 
Ramon Sanchez Parodi is Chief of the Cuban Interests Section 
in Washington, D.C. 
DEATH OF A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION 
"No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed revolutionary posi-
tion, and no internal division can justify atrocious events like 
the physical elimination of Bishop and the group of outstand-
ing, honest, and worthy leaders who died . . . " 
Fidel Castro 
Many explanations have been offered for the collapse of 
the PRG both from supporters and from opponents of the 
Grenadian Revolution. Several surviving members of the 
NJM have willingly acknowledged that the Central Commit-
tee made horrendous errors, but their views have not been 
as widely disseminated as press speculations have been. 
Therefore , those who have opposed the Grenadian Revolu-
tion historically have had a free hand in deliberately dis-
torting the facts . Unfortunately however, much of the infor-
mation needed to make an accurate assessment of what led 
to the disaster in Grenada may never be made available. 
The sequence of events which immediately preceded the 
invasion has been well-publicized: 
• September 14: The NJM Central Committee voted to 
have Prime Minister Maurice Bishop share power with 
Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. 
• October 13: the NJM Central Committee voted to place 
Bishop under house arrest. 
• October 14: the NJM announced that Bishop had been 
removed from office for failing to share power and was 
being replaced by Coard. 
• October 15: Bishop's supporters protested his arrest and 
demanded his release. 
• October 17: Army Commander Hudson Austin an-
nounced that Coard had taken control of the govern-
ment and reiterated that Bishop was under house arrest. 
• October 18: Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman an-
nounced that he and three other ministers had resigned 
in protest. 
• October 19: Thousands of chanting demonstrators freed 
Bishop from house arrest. Maurice Bishop, Jacqueline 
Creft, Unison Whiteman, Vincent Noel, Fitzroy Bain, 
and Noel Bain as well as an unknown number of dem-
onstrators were killed. The army established a Revolu-
tionary Military Council (RMC) to govern Grenada and 
imposed a 24-hour, "shoot on sight" curfew. 
• October 21: General Austin announced that he had been 
named head of the 16-man RMC, dissolved the previous 
government, dismissed its cabinet, and assumed full 
power. 
The Reagan administration was quick to explain the coup 
by characterizing the division within the New Jewel Move-
ment's Central Committee as one between moderate and 
hard-line Marxists, insinuating that Maurice Bishop was 
murdered deliberately because he sought to change the pro-
gressive direction of the PRG. Caribbean leaders collaborat-
ing with the U.S. invasion suggested that it was Bishop's 
appointment of a constitutional commissio_n which led to 
the development of a "communist" plot to remove him. 
Further, these officials suggested that Cuba, a staunch sup-
porter of Bishop and the PRG, had become disenchanted 
with Grenada and sponsored the effort to remove Bishop 
from his leadership position. 
The facts would suggest, however , that the most funda-
mental points of contention within the NJM Central Com-
mittee involved classic questions not unique to any political 
system. Who governs (the party or the people)? What style 
of leadership is best (charismatic leadership or bureaucratic 
rule)? What determines the rate of change (party leadership 
or popular sentiment)? These same fundamental controver-
sies have been predictable problems in all political systems 
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at some point in t i ir tlevelopment irrl!spective of ideological 
orientation. 
Prime Minister Ma,,~d! Bishop is remi!fflbered as a leader 
who had implicit faith q the "masses" antl who hoped to 
restore the Grenadian pet>pl@'s confidence id their ability 
to govern themselves . What'ev@r the issue, he argued that 
the people-though their uniolis1 mass organizations, and 
assemblies-were to participate in tile search for a solution. 
Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard led the other faction 
within the Central Committee which expressed far more con-
fidence in the government than in the people. This group 
saw the party-not the organs of popular democracy-as 
the most effective mechanism for resolving the revolution's 
problems. 
Ironically, Coard's supposedly "hard-line Marxist" posi-
tion was far more typical of the Caribbean's widely-touted 
tradition of democracy than anything else. Historically, only 
a tiny portion of each island's population was ever able to 
participate in or vote for their "representative" govern-
ments. Even after universal suffrage was extended by the 
British in an attempt to appease anti-colonial sentiments 
after WW II, most Caribbean leaders viewed themselves as 
an elite representing those less capable of self-government. 
It was this contemptuous and paternalistic view of the people 
that the NJM had been trying to change through the struc-
tures of popular power and by expanding the party base. 
Thus, even when faced with charges that he was violating 
the party tenets of collective leadership and inefficiently 
handling the business of the state apparatus, Prime Minister 
Bishop urged that the allegations be brought to the people. 
Similarly, when accused of initiating rumors that Bernard 
and Phyllis Coard were trying to kill him, Bishop allegedly 
refused to respond only to his fellow Central Committee 
members but insisted that his case be heard by the general 
population. 
On the question of how best to allocate responsibility and 
tasks however, Maurice Bishop was true to the Caribbean 
tradition. Like other Prime Ministers throughout the region, 
Bishop held several governmental positions of responsibility. 
Bernard Coard argued that this was ineffective and hindered 
both the making and implementation of decisions. It was 
Coard's growing frustration with the supposed inefficiency 
of the NJM decision-making process-coupled to be sure 
with a large measure of personal ambition-which reputedly 
led him to push for a formal system of collective leadership. 
This notion of collective leadership, nonetheless, was no 
more typical of the Caribbean tradition than was the attempt 
to ensure mass participation in the political process. Through-
out every era of their history, Grenadians had been loyal 
to charismatic leaders-not sophisticated ideologies or politi-
cal parties. Almost uniformly, these popular leaders repre-
sented elements of the relatively large black and "colored," 
middle-class elite which had had access to educational oppor-
tunities and professional training abroad. Bishop and Coard, 
like most of the NJM leadership, came from this family 
background; but Bishop had developed and maintained 
stronger ties with the general populace. In recognition of 
this, those advocating a new division of leadership respon-
sibilities never suggested that Bishop be removed from office 
publicly. Instead, they wanted Coard to assume control of 
the party quietly while Bishop maintained the party's link 
to mass organizations, unions, and popular assemblies. Os-
tensibly, it was Bishop's decision to revoke his prior agree-
ment to the proposed change which marked the beginning 
of what became the Grenadian Revolution's end. □ 
VIEWPOINT: RONALD DELLUMS 
When Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip 
O'Neill asked me to be part of the Congressional leader-
ship delegation to investigate events surrounding the inva-
sion of Grenada , I agreed to go with a commitment to in-
vestigate all aspects of the situation, not just those that might 
reinforce my initial view. The trip not only confirmed my 
initial assessment, but in fact raised many new questions-
questions whose answers are to be found in Washington, 
not in Grenada. Were the President's publicly-stated ra-
tionales the real reasons for this invasion? Were peaceful 
alternatives ever considered or proposed; if so, why were 
they rejected; and if not, why weren't they considered? Is 
this use of military force an indication that, for this ad-
ministration, the military option is the preferred solution, 
rather than a last resort, in resolving international disputes? 
What are the implications-political , diplomatic, military-
of the invasion? Why was the press forcibly denied permis-
sion to cover the invasion, and what are the implications 
for a free press in a free society? Had the American people 
been provided initially with all of the information which has 
now come to light, would they have reached the same con-
clusions they reached as a result of the information mani-
pulation carried out by the administration? 
Congress should make a full investigation of the Grenada 
situation, and I have introduced a Resolution of Inquiry to 
begin this process. Although many questions remain to be 
answered, I can say with virtual certainty that the safety of 
the students was never the primary concern of either the 
policymakers or the commanders of the U .S. forces in plan-
ning for or carrying out the invasion. 
Our delegation could find not one confirmed instance in 
which an American was threatened or endangered before 
the invasion. If the safety of the students was the primary 
goal, why did it take the U.S. forces over two days to reach 
the Grand Anse campus which was a mere twenty meters 
from an unprotected beach? The inescapable conclusion is 
that the students' safety was a secondary goal of the 
invasion . 
In a two and a half hour meeting that the Congressional 
delegation had with the Prime Ministers from the Eastern 
Caribbean States, the question of the students ' safety was 
never once raised. Instead, the Prime Ministers raised their 
concern that a "leftist" Grenadian government "threat-
ened" the Eastern Caribbean. The Prime Ministers empha-
sized their desire that the region might have more leaders 
that reflected their own "moderate" views. What they ap-
parently feared was not an external invasion launched from 
Grenada, the supposed rationale behind invoking the Or-
ganization of Eastern Caribbean States charter, but rather 
that improved conditions in Grenada would provide an ex-
ample to their own citizens that might result in internal op-
position to their policies. The desire of these officials to pro-
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tect themselves from internal opposition surely must not be 
seen as sufficient justification to legitimate the U.S. inva-
sion of another country . 
It should be remembered that the Reagan admini stration 
has threatened the invasion of Grenada since the Pentagon 
conducted "Operation Ocean Venture" from August to Oc-
tober 1981-a military exercise directed at invading a ficti-
tious island chain in the Caribbean called "Amber and the 
Amberdines" (no relation-according to the administra-
tion-to Grenada and the Grenadines). This administration 
continually frustrated and opposed the Bishop government. 
President Reagan went on television early this year denounc-
ing the construction of the new airport as an indication of 
the military threat supposedly posed by Grenada. Yet, when 
I visited Grenada in April 1982, I was told by all concerned 
that the airport was necessary for commercial and touristic 
purposes. Now, on my return trip following the invasion, 
I am again told by everyone including Mr. Scoon, the Gover-
nor General, that the airport is of vital importance for the 
future of the island . Any attempts to justify the invasion 
based on Bishop's murder is the height of hypocrisy. 
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the 
U.S . mission was to rescue Americans on Grenada, that mis-
sion has already been accomplished and the troops should 
be immediately withdrawn. We were told at first that the 
troops would be staying only one week . Now it is expected 
that they will have to remain well into 1984. Each additional 
day alters their role . They are increasingly acting as an oc-
cupying, rather than as a peace-keeping force. They have 
been involved in the tracking of alleged subversives. They 
have participated in the interrogation and incarceration of 
people whose only "crime" was to be an alleged supporter 
of the Bishop government. They have stuck people in make-
shift prison camps with shipping crates as beds . They have 
even participated in searching for "subversive" books and 
other reading materials which they have considered illegiti-
mate. Clearly this is not the proper role of the American 
military. 
I would like to make one final point concerning an ex-
change between Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados 
and myself. In front of the entire Congressional delegation, 
Mr. Adams strongly stated that Congressional Black Caucus 
opposition to the invasion showed a paternalistic attitude 
toward Third World nations. I firmly responded to Mr. 
Adams, stating very clearly to him that the Members of the 
Caucus have never once taken the position that they knew 
what was best for countries in the Caribbean or for any other 
country. I stated to him that I am, as are my Caucus col-
leagues, an American elected to the U .S. House of Represen-
tatives; my obligation and my responsibility are to give my 
analyses and make my best judgments. That Members of 
the Congressional Black Caucus believed the invasion wrong 
is not a paternalistic statement toward Third World coun-
tries rather it is a statement of what our country stands for 
and ~four interest as American citizens. As an American 
and as a Member of the House of Representatives , I neither 
gave up the right to make independent judgments about 
world events, nor should it be my role to acquiesce without 
question to the self-interested policies of other world leaders 
where U.S . actions are involved. It would be the height of 
irresponsibility for me , or any other Member of Congress-
black or white-to do otherwise. □ 
Ronald Dellums represents California's £igh1h Congressional 
Dislricl in !he U.S. House of Representatives. 
PROVING MIGHT MAKES RIGHT 
" I rhink rhe A merican people werP hungry_{or a mtfitary suc-
cess, ro have somerhing go righr afrer we gor in volved. " 
Senator Sam Nunn 
Less than two weeks after the New Jewel Movement Cen-
tral Committee voted to place Maurice Bishop under house 
arrest and only two days after the bombing of U.S. Marine 
Headquarters in Lebanon, the U.S . Armed Forces invaded 
Grenada. Shortly thereafter, President Reagan appeared 
with Dominican Prime Minister Eugenia Charles by his side 
and began offering duplicitous rationales for the U.S.-
sponsored invasion . In order to best manipulate public opin-
ion, the administration excluded members of the press from 
the island until "hostilities" had ceased, citing as concerns 
the reporters' safety and the need to preserve national securi-
ty. Although hailed by Reagan supporters as a victory, the 
invasion of Grenada has raised new doubts and rekindled 
old fears throughout the world about the nature of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
President Reagan first argued that the invasion was nec-
essary to protect the lives of U.S . medical students study-
ing on the island. Only after it was known that officials of 
the medical school and parents of the students had opposed 
the invasion and had been convinced that the students were 
in little jeopardy were the administration's claims inves-
tigated . 
Next, Prime Minister Eugenia Charles was thrust forward 
as the representative of Grenada's "threatened neighbor 
states," who requested the U.S. invasion . Quoting the ob-
scure and unofficial OECS treaty, President Reagan and 
Prime Minister Charles attempted to convince the world that 
the invasion was not only legal, but the fulfillment of an 
obligation under law. These arguments quickly were dis-
missed once the actual treaty was obtained and its language 
examined. 
Again, as more information became available, it became 
clear that the OECS treaty was only a pretext for the Reagan 
administration's own decision to invade. Indeed, the "in-
vitation'' from the OECS countries to the U.S. was drafted 
in Washington and transmitted to the meeting in which the 
proposed invasion was discussed by Milan Bish, U.S . Am-
bassador to the Eastern Caribbean. Both the U.S. Ambas-
sador and Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica were present 
at this "OECS" meeting held in Barbados, a non-OECS 
country. Although not parties to the treaty, both Seaga and 
Bish participated in the discussion, urging that an invita-
tion to invade be issued in the name of the OECS. _Staunch-
ly proclaiming that the islands of the region were inseparable 
and that the action taken against Grenada was done out of 
familial concern, Caribbean leaders supporting the invasion 
made no mention of the proposed action to the regional 
heads of state in attendance at the CARI COM meeting held 
in Trinidad to consider the cri sis. Instead, the supporters 
of the invasion curried favo r with the Reagan administra-
tion while deliberately deceiving fellow CARI COM members 
(the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, and Trinidad) which strongly 
opposed military intervention. 
When the administration's first two justifications were de-
bunked within two days, Reagan offered another rationale 
for the invasion which proved equally ludicrous. Supposed-
ly, the island of Grenada had become a Soviet-Cuban mili-
tary base. Therefore, he argued U.S. forces had arrived " just 
in time" to prevent such a takeover. To buttress this argu-
ment , administration officials focused only on the resistance 
of Cuban construction workers and the potential impact the 
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invasion might have on Cuban policies. No mention was 
made of Grenadian resistance or casualties, and commenta-
tors noted that it often seemed that the administration con-
sidered Cuba's expulsion from the island to be the real goal. 
Not until the press ban had been lifted and Canadian jour-
nalists reported finding a mental hospital destroyed were 
U.S . officials even willing to estimate the number of Grena-
dians killed and injured. Spokespersons for the administra-
tion were instead anxious to shift world attention to the 
sheds containing handguns and ammunition found by U.S. 
forces. Most of the equipment was antiquated, and even the 
most modern of the weapons constituted no threat to the 
U.S. After examining the "huge arms cache," Mike Royko 
wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times on November I: 
The weapons in one of the "arehouses turned o ut 10 be ,ach 
of rice and cans of sardines. Another had truck pans . A third 
was filled with canteens and clo1hing . A, for the 1hree ware-
houses 1ha1 did ha ve wea po n,-1hey weren't stacked 10 th e 
ceiling, a s 1he president ,aid . The~ were about one-founh 
full. Man y o f1he rifle, were made in 1870- old breach-load-
ing saddle guns. Other, were W\\' 11 , image . . . ii wa , an 
arsenal, all righ1. bu1 you ' ll find more ba ng for your buck 
in any Ameri can gun sho p . 
Although each of the three ju~tifications offered by the 
Reagan administration came to be eventually discredited, 
the reasons they publicly stated for the invasion seemed 
almost immaterial. The important fact was that three years 
of hard-line rhetoric against the Grenadian Revolution had 
been transformed into action-not that it had taken seven 
thousand specially-trained U .S. forces , ele\'en warships (in-
cluding aircraft and helicopter carriers), and dozens of trans-
port planes to conquer a virtually unarmed people. Return-
ing combat troops were treated as heroes, but the equipment 
malfunctions and self-inflicted accidental casualties were 
rarely mentioned. Off the record, military advisors com-
mented that against an y force other than one as marginally 
equipped as Grenada's, the military objectives of the inva-
sion would not have been met. Publi cly however, the inva-
sion was portrayed as an experiment for the military de-
signed to test the logi stics of conducting certain kinds of 
intervention. 
The tragic aspects of th e Grenada inva~ion go far beyond 
the loss of at least 160 Grenadian, 7 I Cuban, and 18 Ameri-
can lives. Several dangerous precedents were established , and 
accepted principles violated. The relatively sacred first 
amendment right of a free press-one that the United States 
is quick to impose on countries even with no similar provi-
sion in their constitution-was ignored and then disparaged 
by admini stration official s who proudly revealed that mili-
tary officials had been allowed to decide that reporters 
should be excluded from the scene. The callous indifference 
exhibited toward Grenadians themselves once again rein-
forced the notion that black lives are expendable: exact 
figures were available on the number of bullets used before 
there was any accounting of Grenadian casualties. The gov-
ernment of Grenada, like those of progressive African states, 
was portrayed as incapable of action without Cuban or 
Soviet directions . President Reagan denigrated the use of 
international fora or regional institutions to preserve peace 
by scorning the significance of worldwide condemnation 
which followed the invasion. Instead of considering force 
to be a last resort, the U.S. government had proven again 
that it will first move unilaterally against those daring to 
attempt another process of societal development and that 
only countries capable of presenting a military threat will 
be entitled to peaceful co-existence. · =:J 
VIEWPOINT: TOM FARER 
Under the view of international law held by the vast ma-
jority of Western scholars, there are only three legal justifica-
tions for sending troops into a foreign state. One is the rescue 
of one's own citizens. Most Third World scholars and gov-
ernments categorically reject this rationale in part because 
invasions were carried out during the nineteenth and well 
into the twentieth century not so much to rescue citizens as 
to protect property. Hence the doctrine of so-called 
"H umanitarian Intervention" carries disagreeable historical 
baggage. Nonetheless, most Western scholars:,~ould argue 
that at least where a substantial number of c1t1zens are at 
risk, the prohibition against projecting power across national 
frontiers does not control. 
There are, however, certain conditions which have to be 
satisfied before a country can legally carry out an invasion 
to rescue its citizens. One condition is prior exhaustion of 
remedies. If the danger to human life is not so imminent 
that immediate action is required, then non-military reme-
dies must be tried. If time permits, a country must, for ex-
ample, negotiate with the target state in an effort to obtain 
necessary guarantees. 
It seems awfully clear now to the outsider-as it apparent-
ly was clear to the Reagan administration at the time-that 
there was no imminent threat to American citizens in Gre-
nada. Since the coup leaders seemed to be in control and 
had gone out of their way to reassure U.S. citizens ~hat they 
would not be harmed , the existence of any threat 1s debat-
able. In any event, as long as no imminent threat existed 
the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement could not be 
satisfied. 
The U.S. alleged that the airport was closed on the Mon-
day before the invasion. We now know that the airport was 
useable at least for chartered flights, since some persons 
in fact ~ere evacuated. The only authentic fear concerning 
the safety of the U.S . citizens seems to have stemmed from 
the belief that in the event of a decision to invade Grena-
da-in the event, that is, of a decision to violate interna-
tional law-the Grenadian security forces would be terribly 
tempted to use U.S. citizens as hostages. Obviously, the U.S . 
cannot bootstrap a legal justification for the invasion by in-
voking the possibility of an illegal act (taking hostages) oc-
curring as a consequence of its own, prior illegal act. That's 
hardly a serious argument. So we can simply reject the pro-
tection-of-nationals rationale. 
Only two possible legal justifications remain. One is the 
argument that the U.S. was responding to an invitation from 
the Island's duly constituted authorities. This argument has 
not been pressed very hard because it is so palpably ludi-
crous. The so-called authority, who may or may not have 
issued such an invitation, was Sir Paul Scoon, the Gover-
nor General. But in Commonwealth states that have 
achieved full independence, as Grenada had, the Governor 
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General occupies a purely ceremonial position. He is the 
representative of the Queen in her capacity as nominal and 
entirely ceremonial head of the host state. It is a measure 
of his authority that the Governor General is nominated-
in effect named-by the Prime Minister of the state where 
he serves. 
Rhodesia was a semi-independent country in 1965 at the 
time of its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). 
Great Britain still retained ultimate authority over the coun-
try's foreign and defense policy. Nevertheless, when prior 
to UDI, Rhodesia withdrew from the Central African Fed-
eration, a step which many regarded as preliminary to a uni-
lateral declaration of independence, the British government 
took the position that it had no right to reassert authority 
over this semi-independent colony. When it was argued that 
sovereignty and hence final authority in all matters rested 
with Parliament, the British government answered that an 
act of Parliament narrowing Rhodesia's internal self-gov-
ernment would violate British constitutional traditions. 
To suggest that the Governor General had the authority 
to invite in a foreign force is to betray either hypocrisy or 
ignorance. And the U.S. cannot avoid this point by '?anipu-
lating its recognition of the government of Grenada m order 
to attribute authority to someone who clearly did not have 
either formal authority or effective control. 
We are now reduced to the final rationale. One would 
have to argue that Grenada had been occupied by a foreign 
power and its lawful government eliminated. Therefore, al-
though there was no one to invite the U.S. in to rescue the 
country, the U.S. could engage in an act of "collective self-
defense," on the assumption that, under the stipulated con-
ditions, a request for assistance should be implied. ~ertainly, 
one could imagine a case in which some sudden, rapid move-
ment of foreign forces into a country resulted in the exter-
mination of the government. In such a case, the government 
would revert to the people of the country. Clearly, there 
would have been an act of aggression and an occupation 
of the country; and under the UN Charter, intervention 
would have been permissible. 
In the case of Grenada, the argument would have to be 
made that Cuba had occupied the island. Are there facts 
to support that argument? It seems to me that the answer 
is no. There were some allegations made. Indeed, the Reagan 
administration tried in the first several days to present or 
at least imply such an argument. But we now have enough 
facts to see that the implication is baseless. Most Cubans 
were in fact engaged in construction and other aid activities. 
All were there at the invitation of the indisputably legitimate 
Bishop government. And there is no evidence that they con-
nived with the persons who seized power from Bishop. On 
the contrary, now having the minutes of the Grenadian Cen-
tral Committee meetings, we can see that the Cuban con-
demnation of Bishop's overthrow was an honest expression 
of its views. There is no shred of evidence that the coup 
against Bishop was planned by the Cubans or even su?se-
quently and tacitly approved by them. The country remamed 
in the hands of Grenadians. The hands were bloody. Un-
fortunately, the fratricidal coup is not a singular phenom-
enon in today's world. If every coup were held to justify 
armed intervention, little would be left of the doctrine of 
non-intervention. □ 
Tom Farer was President of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights from 1980-1982 and is a fellow at the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
THE I'.\1V ASION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Contrary to the assertions made by the Reagan adminis-
tration, the invasion of Grenada found no sanction in in-
ternational law. None of the documents cited by proponents 
of the in\·asion actually read in support of the action taken 
by the in\·ading countries. In fact the language of relevant 
provisions directly contradicts any argument offered in sup-
port of the invasion. The action was neither authorized by 
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) or 
Rio treaties , nor was it in conformity with the Charters of 
the Organization of American States or the United Nations. 
Article 8 of the Treary Esrablishing rhe Organizarion of 
Eastern Caribbean Srates has been most frequently invoked 
to justify the request for a U.S.-led invasion of Grenada. 
However, the provisional language of Article 8 clearly re-
quires unanimity and authorizes collective action only 
against external aggression: 
The Defense and Security Committee shall have responsibility 
for co-ordinating the efforts of :vlember States for collec-
tive defense and the presen·a1ion of peace and security against 
external aggression and for the development of close ties 
among the :vlember States of th e Organization in maners of 
external defense and securit y, including measures to co m-
bat the activities of mercena ri es, operating with or without 
the support of internal or national elements, in the exercise 
of the inherent right of indi vidual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the U11i1ed 'a-
t ions ... The decision and directives of the Defense and 
Security Committee shall be unanimous and shall be binding 
on all subordinate institutions of the Organization unless 
otherwise determined by the Authority. 
While other members of the OECS voted to invade, Grenada 
was not represented at the meeting in which the issue was 
being considered. Since none of the parties has seriously tried 
to argue that Grenada constituted an external threat, clear-
ly neither of the two conditions of Article 8 was satisfied. 
Advocates of the invasion who cited these OECS provisions 
during the UN debate on the issue were quickly reminded 
not only of the failure to meet Article 8 criteria, but of the 
fact that the treaty never had been duly registered with the 
UN Secretariat (pursuant to Article 102 of the United Na-
tions Charter) so could not be invoked before that body as 
a basis for action. 
Not surprisingly, proponents of the invasion omit any ref-
erence to Articles 18 or 20 of the OAS Charter because the 
actions taken by the United States and its six Caribbean allies 
are in direct violation of each. Articles I 8 and 22 state: 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly 
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the interna l or ex-
ternal affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle pro-
hibits not only armed force but also any other form of in-
terference or attempted threat against the personality of the 
State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements 
.. The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the 
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other 
measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirect-
ly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or 
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means 
of coercion shall be recognized. 
Instead, those arguing on behalf of the U.S. invasion cite 
the Rio Treaty, which established a permanent defensive al-
liance among the republics of the Americas in 1947, one year 
before the Charter of the Organization of American States 
was signed. None of the English-speaking Caribbean states 
was independent at that time, however, and so were not par-
ties to the Rio Treaty which has in any case been superced-
ed by the subsequent OAS Charter. 
Proponents of the administration's Grenada action have 
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also chosen to selectively cite Article 22 of the OAS charter 
to buttress their claim of the invasion's adherence to norms 
established through international law: 
Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and secur i-
ty in accordance with existing treaties do not const itut e a 
violation of the principles set forth in Articles 18 and 20. 
However, legal analysts concur in an understanding that the 
Article 22 reference to "existing treaties" pertains only to 
agreements that existed at the time of the OAS Charter 
(1947) or its latest Amendments (1967) . The 1981 signatory 
date of the Treaty establishing the OECS thus excludes it 
from consideration within the parameters of this provision. 
Defenders of the United States ''splendid little war'' also 
chose to cite Article 52 of Chapter VII from the UN Charter 
to bolster their claim of legality. However, while Subsec-
tion I of Article 52 states that regional arrangements are 
not precluded by the Charter, Subsection 2 of the same ar-
ticle is equally clear in asserting that regional agencies should 
make every effort to achieve pacific settlements of local 
disputes: 
No thing in the present Charter precludes the exi,1ence of 
regional arrangement s or agencies for dealing with , uch mat-
ters relating to the maintenance of international peace and 
security as are appropriate for regional action, pro,·idcd 1ha1 
such arrangements or agencies and their ac 1i vi1ie, arc con-
sisten t with the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions .... The members of the United Nations entering in-
to such arrangements or const ituting suc h agencies shall make 
every effort to achieve pacific sett lement of loca l di spute; 
through such regional arrangements or by such regional agen-
cies before referring them to the Securit y Cou ncil. 
Further, Article 53 states that regional agencies are not to 
take enforcement action without the authorization of the 
U.N. Security Council-except in cases against the Axis 
powers of WWII: 
The Security Council sha ll , where appropriate, utilize such 
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement act ion 
under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be tak en 
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without 
the authorization of the Security Council, with the excep-
tion of measures against any enemy state, as de fined in 
paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant 10 Arti-
cle 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal 
of aggressive policy on the part of any such stat e, until such 
time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments 
concerned , be charged with the respo nsibilit y for preventing 
further aggression by such a state .... The term enemy state 
as used in paragraph I of this Article applies to any state 
which during the Second World War has been an enemy of 
any signatory of the present Charter. 
The misrepresentation of documentary provisions is on-
ly one aspect of the administration's effort to disguise the 
illegality of its action in Grenada. An illusion of legality can 
only be maintained through public unawareness of the fun-
damental concepts adapted by international consensus 
through Chapter I of the UN Charter: 
... The [UNI is based on the principle of the sovereign equal-
ity of all its members ... All members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state 
Using any standard of international law, the territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of the Grenadian state 
have been violated by the U .S.-sponsored invasion and 
occupation. D 
VIEWPOINT: DESSIMA WILLIAMS 
There have been many reports that the invasion of our 
country was welcomed by the Grenadian population both 
at home and abroad. This is a very sad and unfortunate posi-
tion for our people. Against the background of confusion, 
fear, and grief over the losses of loved ones and respected 
leaders and given the psychological program which has been 
employed since the moment the soldiers landed, I under-
stand why some have reacted in this way. We must be honest 
and acknowledge that on the 25th of October a very tense 
and politically very difficult situation existed in Grenada. 
But the views of the Grenadian people which have been 
reported also must be seen as part of the psychological pro-
gram being orchestrated by the invaders. 
I do not expect, however, our people to continue to hold 
this position for very long. It will be one of the more com-
plex political issues for a long time to come, but it will never 
be considered politically correct to have welcomed an ex-
ternal military occupying force as a freedom train. This 
would be a break with our history and with our principles. 
As <;mr people are allowed to be free psychologically to 
analyze the events, to search for internal solutions, and to 
express themselves-as they cannot do under U.S. occupa-
tion-we will see further clarity on this point. 
Now, the program of occupation is very intense. The 
United States government is lord over decisions which should 
be made by the sovereign state of Grenada. The U.S. forces 
have decided whom to expel and whom they will allow to 
remain. They have arrested, interrogated, searched, warned, 
and harassed more than two thousand Grenadian citizens, 
including George Louison and Kendrick Radix, two surviv-
ing leaders of the People's Revolutionary Government. They 
have established military camps around the country to house 
those who have been detained in little boxes. Ironically, the 
Reagan administration recently established in tiny Grenada 
one of the largest embassies that it has in the Caribbean. 
Grenada, with which the U.S. government refused to estab-
lish diplomatic relations, now has a U.S. Embassy that 
employs nearly eighty people. 
I am clear and confident that the occupation of Grenada 
cannot last and will not last. My optimism is based on a 
number of factors . We must remember that the New Jewel 
Movement was a party which was grounded in the people. 
It was a party of ordinary workers, students, housewives, 
women, and others who understood the historic role that 
we were playing in our country. We were working to move 
Grenada out of those dark, dismal days of brutality and 
poverty and into a new phase of popular participation, prog-
ress, and betterment for all of our people. 
The party, which grew over these last ten years, had this 
character, this origin, and this relation with our society. That 
does not go away because six thousand U.S. soldiers have 
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overrun the country. What the party stood for and the way 
in which it carried out that process will eventually grow and 
go forward. 
The Revolutionary Military Council-of which so much 
has been heard-must be condemned as a force that broke 
the tradition of the party. One of the most basic and fun-
damental traditions of the party was its unrelenting and con-
tinuous link with the people. The People's Revolutionary 
Government, led by a very able and committed cadre, was 
a reflection precisely of these social, political, and other 
realities in the country. They had a commitment to a small, 
poor country that was struggling to get out of the claws of 
dependent underdevelopment and were willing to put their 
shoulders to the wheel. 
The Central Committee which existed for one week before 
the execution of Maurice Bishop and the Revolutionary 
Military Council which was formed immediately after the 
executions had divorced themselves from that reality. They 
had lost touch with what was happening in the country. They 
became alienated from the most important and critical pillar 
of our revolution: we must be grounded in the people, we 
must abide by the wishes of the people, and we must march 
with them not run ahead of them. 
While we do not know the full reasons or the full forces 
both internal and external that have contributed to this 
serious setback in the process of our revolution, we must 
understand that blame must be fully and squarely laid at 
the feet of those who comprised the decision-making struc-
ture during those critical hours because they broke ranks 
with the people. How could a revolution which brought so 
many issues for decision before the people-legislation about 
women, decisions on the budget, decisions on other major 
issues-consider removing the leader of the revolution with-
out bringing it to the people? That in itself represented a 
total abrogation of the most basic and vital element of our 
political philosophy and culture. Those who made the fatal 
errors merely created an artificial political structure (one 
could hardly describe it as a leadership) which failed com-
pletely to understand the continuum along which the Grena-
dian revolution had developed. 
What is happening in Grenada now in terms of the pro-
gram of fierce and brutal occupation is both absolutely un-
justified and totally dishonorable. The American people 
ought not allow such a program to be carried out in their 
name. They also have an obligation to seek to avert yet 
another invasion, yet another military expedition into 
Nicaragua or El Salvador or some other country for that 
matter. There are 7,000 American troops in Honduras on 
the Nicaraguan border now. Over the last several years, we 
have seen the continued expansion of U.S. military person-
nel in Lebanon, the Philippines, and in other places. I ask 
the American people to stand guard so that there are no 
more Grenadas in this or any other part of the world. I also 
ask that they assist Grenada in the search for its sovereign-
ty. No good can come for either the Grenadian or the Amer-
ican people by having Grenada transformed into another 
Puerto Rico in the Americas. 
The Grenadian Revolution which so many of us em-
braced, supported, criticized, learned from, and lived with 
is going through a very difficult period. We go forward, 
however, saying and believing that it is truly forward ever 
and backward never. D 
Dessima Williams was Grenada's Ambassador to the 
Organization of American States. 
COLONY IN THE MAKING 
" ... [T]he island's independence is not very much in evidence . 
. Grenada looks like nothing so much as a new U.S. de-
pendency . There is hardly a11 aspect of Grenadian life that 
is not tinged by the overwhelming U.S. presence ... " 
Loren Jenkins, The Washington Post 
Since the first days of the invasion, the United States has 
been establishing the mechanisms for its domination of Gre-
nada for the foreseeable future. U.S. military forces-not 
Grenadian police or Caribbean troops-arrested and detained 
individuals, conducted warrantless searches of people and 
property, interrogated citizens and foreigners about their po-
litical beliefs and associations, warned people not to partici-
pate in "anti-government" activities, and seized so-called 
"pro-Marxist" literature. American troops built the deten-
tion facilities that consisted of small, wooden cells used to 
contain 1200 people suspected of being active in the former 
People's Revolutionary Government. Meanwhile, the U.S . 
Army Psychological Operations Battalion prepared and cir-
culated posters of Hudson Austin and Bernard Coard in 
humiliating positions and demeaning states of undress, 
broadcasted public service announcements for the U.S. Navy 
technicians operating the lone radio station, and otherwise at-
tempted to general popular sentiment against the revolution. 
Reports of constitutional violations and civil liberty abuses 
only served to highlight the very nebulous nature of any legal 
authority on the island. Although the U.S. thrust Sir Paul 
Scoon into the limelight, the preeminent authorities on the 
island indisputably were first Major General Jack Farris, 
commander of the U.S. forces in Grenada, and now Charles 
Gillespie, the new U.S. ambassador to Grenada. The interim 
Attorney General already has resigned stating, "I have never 
known a situation where a Governor General appoints 
himself as savior for his people, calls in foreign armies, and 
then does very little to bring about a restoration of constitu-
tional civil government." 
The relationship between the formal authority of interim 
government officials and the substantive power of U.S. au-
thorities can be illustrated by their divergent approaches to 
the resolution of questions surrounding the circumstances 
of Bishop's death. One of the interim government's earliest 
pronouncements concerned the formation of a commission 
to conduct an official inquiry into the deaths at Fort Rupert. 
Yet the interim government's legal advisor announced that 
such an investigatory commission would inherently compro-
mise the right of any accused to a fair trial. Instead, U.S. 
civilian authorities-reported to include CIA interrogators-
are to acquire and present evidence of official conduct dur-
ing the power struggle which led to the murder of Bishop. 
Perhaps because U.S. forensic experts had claimed earlier 
that no positive identification of Bishop's body was possi-
ble, even Grenadians who did not support PRG policies 
suspected that U.S. officials would deliberately withhold the 
truth in order to prevent popular affection for Bishop from 
becoming a renewal of support for "the revo." With only 
Grenada's traffic officers functioning in their normal capac-
ity however, Grenadians have no source of redress. Even 
police functions have been assumed by U.S. soldiers and 
CIA interrogators or by the Caribbean peace-keeping force 
led by Major General Farris. 
In addition the Reagan administration has been seeking 
to win support from Grenada's private sector by flooding 
the island's economy with dollars. According to Newsweek, 
"Now that the U.S . invasion of Grenada has made the island 
safe for capitalism , the Commerce Department has been 
deluged with inquiries from businessmen looking for cheap 
labor or beach front property.'' Fifty representatives of trade 
associations, corporations, and non-profit associations were 
invited to the White House for a pep talk on the potential 
value of an investment in Grenada. Reagan administration 
officials have been urging U.S. businessmen to take their 
credit and technology to Grenada where raw materials and 
labor are relatively cheap. USA! D has facilitated the ex-
ploration of profitable investment opportunities in Grenada 
by arranging for potential businessmen to travel together 
and to meet their "small but vital" Grenadian counterparts. 
Although careful to explain that the current level of govern-
ment aid to Grenada will have to be tapered down in the 
future, Reagan administration officials also have stressed 
that Grenada's tax policies and investment codes will be 
changed to fit the provisions of the CBI. USAID spokes-
persons have announced: a $5 million ass istance grant has 
been awarded the new Grenadian government, $4.5 million 
has been allocated for the rehabilitation of 12 to 14 miles 
of the worst roads and the short-term training of public 
works personnel, $2.5 million has been granted for social 
service programs, $2 million for agriculture , and$ I million 
for such private sector initiatives as a local Chamber of 
Commerce study of "laws and regulations ." Another $15 
million is to fund a military training program for Grenada 
and the 6 nations which contributed to the 300-man Carib-
bean contingent of the U .S.-led invasion . Almost $3.5 mil-
lion more will be sent to Grenada for emergency aid . 
The $34.4 million financial assistance program designated 
for Grenada in the current fiscal year and the $18.4 million 
given Grenada by the United States since the invasion have 
been used by the Reagan supporters to imply that the $22.5 
million granted Grenada by the "Communist Bloc" in 1982 
was stingy and inconsequential. Nonetheless, even U.S . State 
Department officials have had to acknowledge that currently 
the island's most pressing need is for doctors to replace the 
Cuban physicians who were expelled. Reagan administration 
officials also have had to concede that Grenada is in dire 
need of a modern airport and that it would make little sense 
to leave the Point Salines site only two-thirds complete . 
Some U.S. spokespersons have suggested that any modern 
airport be named after Paul Scoon, their "man of the 
hour," but they have quietly voiced their fear that Grenadi-
ans will consider only one name-Maurice Bishop . 
Shortly after the invasion, Grenada's interim government 
promised that true self-governance would be achieved when 
elections were held within six months. More recent pro-
nouncements indicate that this is highly improbable: current 
predictions are that elections may be as much as three years 
away. Moreover, the Reagan administration will relinquish 
ultimate control over Grenadian affairs only when the last 
vestiges of the PRG have been swept away and the election 
of a government more to its liking is assured. Until such 
time, U.S. combat troops may have been sent home, but 
real power will remain in American hands. Consequently, 
some Grenadians have begun to ask when the once-wel-
comed Americans will leave. As one young Grenadian in-
quired, " ... who is going to rescue us from our rescuers." 
Despite the U.S. largess, open hostility toward a protracted 
occupation of the island will grow. Unless the Reagan ad-
ministration allows genuine self-determination for that na-
tion soon, Grenadian support for the invaders will surely 
fade . D 
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